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Abstract—E-voting systems have emerged as a powerful tech-
nology for improving democracy by reducing election cost, in-
creasing voter participation, and even allowing voters to directly
verify the entire election procedure. Prior internet voting systems
have single points of failure, which may result in the compromise
of availability, voter secrecy, or integrity of the election results.
In this paper, we present the design, implementation, security
analysis, and evaluation of D-DEMOS, a complete e-voting system
that is distributed, privacy-preserving and end-to-end verifiable.
Our system includes a fully asynchronous vote collection subsys-
tem that provides immediate assurance to the voter her vote was
recorded as cast, without requiring cryptographic operations on
behalf of the voter. We also include a distributed, replicated and
fault-tolerant Bulletin Board component, that stores all necessary
election-related information, and allows any party to read and
verify the complete election process. Finally, we also incorporate
trustees, i.e., individuals who control election result production
while guaranteeing privacy and end-to-end-verifiability as long
as their strong majority is honest.
Our system is the first e-voting system whose voting operation
is human verifiable, i.e., a voter can vote over the web, even
when her web client stack is potentially unsafe, without sacrificing
her privacy, and still be assured her vote was recorded as cast.
Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third
parties, still without sacrificing privacy. Finally, as the number
of auditors increases, the probability of election fraud going
undetected is diminished exponentially.
We provide a model and security analysis of the system. We
implement a prototype of the complete system, we measure its
performance experimentally, and we demonstrate its ability to
handle large-scale elections.
I. INTRODUCTION
E-voting systems have emerged as a powerful technology
to improve the election process. Kiosk-based e-voting systems,
e.g., [12], [15], [26], [13], [10], [23], allow the tally to be
produced faster, but require the voter’s physical presence at
the booth. Internet e-voting systems, e.g., [21], [8], [17], [31],
[27], [35], [12], [13], [35], [29], however, allow voters to cast
their votes remotely. Internet voting systems have the potential
to enhance the democratic process by reducing election costs
and by increasing voter participation for social groups that
face considerable physical barriers and overseas voters. In
addition, several internet voting systems [8], [31], [35], [29]
allow voters and auditors to directly verify the integrity of the
entire election process, providing end-to-end verifiability. This
is a highly desired property that has emerged in the last decade,
where voters can be assured that no entities, even the election
authorities, have manipulated the election result. Despite their
potential, existing internet voting systems suffer from single
points of failure, which may result in the compromise of voter
secrecy, service availability, or integrity of the result [12], [15],
[26], [13], [10], [21], [8], [17], [31], [27], [35], [29].
In this paper, we present the design and prototype implemen-
tation of D-DEMOS, a distributed, end-to-end verifiable internet
voting system, with no single point of failure during the election
process (that is, besides setup). We set out to overcome two
major limitations in existing internet voting systems. The first,
is their dependency on centralized components. The second is
their requirement for the voter to run special software on their
devices, which processes cryptographic operations. Overcoming
the latter allows votes to be cast with a greater variety of client
devices, such as feature phones using SMS, or untrusted public
web terminals. Our design is inspired by the novel approach
proposed in [29], where the voters are used as a source of
randomness to challenge the zero-knowledge proof protocols;
the latter are used to enable end-to-end verifiability.
We design a distributed vote collection subsystem that is
able to collect votes from voters and assure them their vote was
recorded as cast, without requiring any cryptographic operation
from the client device. This allows voters to vote via SMS, a
simple console client over a telnet session, or a public web
terminal, while preserving their privacy. At election end time,
vote collectors agree on a single set of votes asynchronously,
and upload it to a second distributed component, the Bulletin
Board (BB ). This is a replicated service that publishes its
data immediately and makes it available to the public forever.
Our third distributed subsystem, trustees are a set of persons
entrusted with secret keys that can unlock information from
the BB . We share these secret keys among the trustees, making
sure only an honest majority can uncover information from the
BB . Trustees interact with the BB once the votes are uploaded
to it, to produce and publish the final election tally.
The resulting voting system is end-to-end verifiable, by
the voters themselves, as well as third-party auditors; all
this while preserving voter privacy. A voter can provide an
auditor information from her ballot; the auditor can read
from the distributed BB and verify the complete process,
including the correctness of the election setup by election
authorities. Additionally, as the number of auditors increases,
the probability of election fraud going undetected diminishes
exponentially.
Finally, we implement a prototype of the complete D-
DEMOS voting system. We measure its performance experi-
mentally, under a variety of election settings, demonstrating
its ability to handle thousands of concurrent connections, and
thus manage large-scale elections.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• We present the world’s first complete, state-of-the-art, end-
to-end verifiable, distributed voting system with no single
point of failure besides setup.
• The system allows voters to verify their vote was tallied-
as-intended without the assistance of special software
or trusted devices, and external auditors to verify the
correctness of the election process. Additionally, the
system allows voters to delegate auditing to a third party
auditor, without sacrificing their privacy.
• We provide a model and a security analysis of our voting
system.
• We implement a prototype of the integrated system,
measure its performance and demonstrate its ability to
handle large-scale elections.
II. RELATED WORK
Voting systems: Several end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems
have been introduced, e.g. the kiosk-based systems [15], [26],
[13], [10] and the internet voting systems [8], [31], [35], [29].
In all these works, the Bulletin Board (BB ) is a single point
of failure and has to be trusted.
Dini presents a distributed e-voting system, which however
is not end-to-end verifiable [24]. In [23], there is a distributed
BB implementation, also handling vote collection, according
to the design of the vVote end-to-end verifiable e-voting
system [22], which in turn is an adaptation of the Preˆt a`
Voter e-voting system [15]. In [23], the proper operation of the
BB during ballot casting requires a trusted device for signature
verification. In contrast, our vote collection subsystem is done
so that correct execution of ballot casting can be “human
verifiable”, i.e., by simply checking the validity of the obtained
receipt. Additionally, our vote collection subsystem is fully
asynchronous, always deciding with exactly n f inputs, while
in [23], the system uses a synchronous approach based on the
FloodSet algorithm from [32] to agree on a single version of
the state.
DEMOS [29] is an end-to-end verifiable e-voting system,
which introduces the novel idea of extracting the challenge of
the zero-knowledge proof protocols from the voters’ random
choices; we leverage this idea in our system too. However,
DEMOS uses a centralized Election Authority (EA), which
maintains all secrets throughout the entire election procedure,
collects votes, produces the result and commits to verification
data in the BB . Hence, the EA is a single point of failure,
and because it knows the voters’ votes, it is also a critical
privacy vulnerability. In this work, we address these issues
by introducing distributed components for vote collection
and result tabulation, and we do not assume any trusted
component during election. Additionally, DEMOS does not
provide any recorded-as-cast feedback to the voter, whereas
our system includes such a mechanism. Moreover, in our
design, the committed verification data in the BB support
auditing with asymptotically lower computational cost w.r.t.
the number of options, compared to DEMOS. Finally, the
zero-knowledge proofs in DEMOS have a large soundness
error which decreases the effectiveness of zero-knowledge
application, while in this work we obtain nearly optimal overall
zero-knowledge soundness.
Furthermore, none of the above works provide any perfor-
mance evaluation results.
State Machine Replication: Castro et al. [11] introduce a
practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant replicated state machine
protocol. In the last several years, several protocols for
Byzantine Fault Tolerant state machine replication have been
introduced to improve performance ([20], [30]), robustness ([9],
[19]), or both ([18]). Our system does not use the state machine
replication approach to handle vote collection, as it would be
inevitably more costly. Each of our vote collection nodes can
validate a voter’s requests on its own. In addition, we are
able to process multiple different voters’ requests concurrently,
without enforcing the total ordering inherent in replicated state
machines. Finally, we do not wish voters to use special client-
side software to access our system.
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A. Problem Definition and Goals
We consider an election with a single question andm options,
for a voter population of size n, where voting takes place
between a certain begin and end time (the voting hours), and
each voter may select a single option.
Our major goals in designing our voting system are three.
1) It has to be end-to-end verifiable, so that anyone can verify
the complete election process. Additionally, voters should be
able to outsource auditing to third parties, without revealing
their voting choice. 2) It has to be fault-tolerant, so that an
attack on system availability and correctness is hard. 3) Voters
should not have to trust the terminals they use to vote, as such
devices may be malicious. Instead, voters should be assured
their vote was recorded, without disclosing any information on
how they voted to the malicious entity controlling their device.
B. System overview
We employ an election setup component in our system, which
we call the Election Authority (EA ), to alleviate the voter from
employing any cryptographic operations. The EA initializes all
other system components, and then gets immediately destroyed
to preserve privacy. The Vote Collection (VC ) subsystem
collects the votes from the voters during election hours, and
assures them their vote was recorded-as-cast. Our Bulletin
Board (BB ) subsystem, which is a public repository of all
election-related information, is used to hold all ballots, votes,
and the result, either in encrypted or plain form, allowing any
party to read from the BB and verify the complete election
process. The VC subsystem uploads all votes to the BB at
election end time. Finally, our design includes trustees, who are
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persons entrusted with managing all actions needed until result
tabulation and publication, including all actions supporting
end-to-end verifiability. Trustees hold the keys to uncover
any information hidden in the BB , and we use threshold
cryptography to make sure a malicious minority cannot uncover
any secrets or corrupt the process.
Our system starts with the EA generating initialization data
for every component. The EA encodes each election option,
and commits to it using a commitment scheme, as described
below. It encodes the i-th option as ~ei, a unit vector where
the i-th element is 1 and the remaining elements are 0. The
commitment of an option encoding is a vector of (lifted)
ElGamal ciphertexts [25] over elliptic curve, that element-wise
encrypts a unit vector. Note that this commitment scheme is also
additively homomorphic, i.e., the commitment of ea+eb can be
computed by component-wise multiplying the corresponding
commitments of ea and eb. The EA then creates a votecode
and a receipt for each option. Subsequently, the EA prepares
one ballot for each voter, with two functionally equivalent
parts. Each part contains a list of options, along with their
corresponding vote codes and receipts. We consider ballot
distribution to be outside the scope of this paper, but we do
assume ballots, after being produced by the EA , are distributed
in a secure manner to each voter; thus only each voter knows
the vote codes listed in her ballot. We make sure vote codes are
not stored in clear form anywhere besides the voter’s ballot.
Our VC subsystem collects the votes from the voters during
election hours, by accepting up to one vote code from each
voter. The EA initializes each VC node with the vote codes and
the receipts of the voters’ ballots. However, it hides the vote
codes, using a simple commitment scheme based on symmetric
encryption of the plaintext along with a random salt value. This
way, each VC node can verify if a vote code is indeed part
of a specific ballot, but cannot recover any vote code until the
voter actually chooses to disclose it. Additionally, we secret-
share each receipt across all VC -nodes using an (N   f,N)-
VSS (verifiable secret-sharing) scheme with trusted dealer [34],
making sure that a receipt can be recovered and posted back to
the voter only when a strong majority of VC nodes participates
successfully in our voting protocol. With this design, our system
adheres to the following contract with the voters: Any honest
voter who receives a valid receipt from a Vote Collector node,
is assured her vote will be published on the BB, and thus it
will be included in the election tally.
The voter selects one part of her ballot at random, and posts
her selected vote code to one of the VC nodes. When she
receives a receipt, she compares it with the one on her ballot
corresponding to the selected vote code. If it matches, she is
assured her vote was correctly recorded and will be included
in the election tally. The other part of her ballot, the one not
used for voting, will be used for auditing purposes. This design
is essential for verifiability, in the sense that the EA cannot
predict which part a voter may use, and the unused part will
betray a malicious EA with 12 probability per audited ballot.
Our second distributed subsystem is the BB , which is a
replicated service of isolated nodes. Each BB node is initialized
from the EA with vote codes and associated option encodings
in committed form (again, for vote code secrecy), and each
BB node provides public access to its stored information. At
election end time, VC nodes run our Vote Set Consensus
protocol, which guarantees all VC nodes agree on a single set
of voted vote codes. After agreement, each VC node uploads
this set to every BB node. In turn, each BB node publishes
this set once it receives the same copy from enough VC nodes.
Our third distributed subsystem is a set of trustees, who are
persons entrusted with managing all actions needed after vote
collection, until result tabulation and publication; this includes
all actions supporting end-to-end verifiability. Secrets that may
uncover information in the BB are shared across trustees,
making sure malicious trustees under a certain threshold cannot
uncover and disclose sensitive information. We use Pedersen’s
Verifiable linear Secret Sharing (VSS) [33] to split the election
data among the trustees. In a (k, n)-VSS, at least k shares are
required to reconstruct the original data, and any collection
of less than k shares leaks no information about the original
data. Moreover, Pedersen’s VSS is additively homomorphic,
i.e., one can compute the share of a+ b by adding the share
of a and the share of b respectively. This approach allows
trustees to perform homomorphic “addition” on the option-
encodings of cast vote codes, and contribute back a share of
the opening of the homomorphic “total”. Once enough trustees
upload their shares of the “total”, the election tally is uncovered
and published at each BB node.
To ensure voter privacy, the system cannot reveal the content
inside an option encoding commitment at any point. However,
a malicious EA might put an arbitrary value (say 9000 votes
for option 1) inside such a commitment, causing an incorrect
tally result. To prevent this, we utilize the Chaum-Pedersen
zero-knowledge proof [14], allowing the EA to show that the
content inside each commitment is a valid option encoding,
without revealing its actual content. Namely, the prover uses
Sigma OR proof to show that each ElGamal ciphertext encrypts
either 0 or 1, and the sum of all elements in a vector is 1. Our
zero knowledge proof is organized as follows. First, the EA
posts the initial part of the proofs on the BB . Second, during
the election, each voter’s A/B part choice is viewed as a source
of randomness, 0/1, and all the voters’ choices are collected
and used as the challenge of our zero knowledge proof. Finally,
the trustees will jointly produce the final part of the proofs
and post it on the BB before the opening of the tally. Hence,
everyone can verify those proofs on the BB . Due to space, we
omit the zero-knowledge proof components in this paper and
refer the interested reader to [14].
Our design allows any voter to read information from the
BB , combine it with her private ballot, and verify her ballot was
included in the tally. Additionally, any third-party auditor can
read the BB and verify the complete election process. As the
number of auditors increases, the probability of election fraud
going undetected diminishes exponentially. For example, even
if only 10 people audit, with each one having 12 probability
of detecting ballot fraud, the probability of ballot fraud going
undetected is only 12
10
= 0.00097. Thus, even if the EA is
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malicious and, e.g., tries to point all vote codes to a specific
option, this faulty setup will be detected because of the end-
to-end verifiability of the complete system.
C. System and Threat Model
We assume a fully connected network, where each node
can reach any other node with which it needs to communicate.
The network can drop, delay, duplicate, or deliver messages
out of order. However, we assume messages are eventually
delivered, provided the sender keeps retransmitting them. For
all nodes, we make no assumptions regarding processor speeds.
We assume the clocks of VC nodes are synchronized with
real world time; this is needed simply to prohibit voters from
casting votes outside election hours. Besides this, we make
no other timing assumptions in our system. We assume the
EA sets up the election and is destroyed upon completion of
the setup, as it does not directly interact with the remaining
components of the system, thus reducing the attack surface of
the privacy of the voting system as a whole. We also assume
initialization data for every system component is relayed to
it via untappable channels. We assume the adversary does
not have the computational power to violate any underlying
cryptographic assumptions. To ensure liveness, we additionally
assume the adversary cannot delay communication between
honest nodes above a certain threshold. We place no bound on
the number of faulty nodes the adversary can coordinate, as
long as the number of malicious nodes of each subsystem is
below its corresponding fault threshold. We consider arbitrary
(Byzantine) failures, because we expect our system to be
deployed across separate administrative domains. Let Nv , Nb,
and Nt be the number of VC nodes, BB nodes, and trustees
respectively. For each of the subsystems, we have the following
fault tolerance thresholds:
• The number of faulty VC nodes, fv , is strictly less than
1/3 of Nv .
• The number of faulty BB nodes, fb, is strictly less than
1/2 of Nb.
• For the trustees’ subsystem, we apply ht out-of Nt
verifiable secret sharing, where ht is the number of honest
trustees, thus we tolerate ft = Nt  ht malicious trustees.
D. Election Authority
EA produces the initialization data for each election entity
in the setup phase. To enhance the system robustness, we let
the EA generate all the public/private key pairs for all the
system components (except voters) without relying on external
PKI support. We use zero knowledge proofs to ensure the
correctness of all the initialization data produced by the EA .
Voter ballots: The EA generates one ballot ballot` for each
voter `, and assigns a unique 64-bit serial-no` to it. As shown
below, each ballot consists of two parts: Part A and Part B. Each
part contains a list ofm hvote-code, option, receipti tuples, one
tuple for each election option. The EA generates the vote-code
as a 128-bit random number, unique within the ballot, and the
receipt as 64-bit random number.
serial-no`
Part A
vote-code`,1 option`,1 receipt`,1
. . . . . . . . .
vote-code`,m option`,m receipt`,m
Part B
vote-code`,1 option`,1 receipt`,1
. . . . . . . . .
vote-code`,m option`,m receipt`,m
BB initialization data: The initialization data for all
BB nodes is identical, and each BB node publishes its
initialization data immediately. The BB ’s data is used to
show the correspondence between the vote codes and their
associated cryptographic payload. This payload comprises
the committed option encodings, and their respective zero
knowledge proofs of valid encoding (first move of the prover),
as described in section III-B. However, the vote codes must
be kept secret during the election, to prevent the adversary
from “stealing” the voters’ ballots and using the stolen vote
codes to vote. To achieve this, the EA first randomly picks
a 128-bit key, msk, and encrypts each vote-code using AES-
128-CBC with random initialization vector (AES-128-CBC$)
encryption, denoted as [vote-code]msk. Each BB is given
Hmsk  SHA256(msk, saltmsk) and saltmsk, where saltmsk
is a fresh 64-bit random salt. Hence, each BB node can be
assured the key it reconstructs from VC key-shares (see below)
is indeed the key that was used to encrypt these vote-codes.
The rest of the BB initialization data is as follows: for
each serial-no`, and for each ballot part, there is a shuffled
list of
D
[vote-code`,⇡X` (j)]msk, payload`,⇡X` (j)
E
tuples, where
⇡X` 2 Sm is a random permutation (X is A or B). We shuffle
the list of tuples of each part to ensure voter’s privacy. This
way, nobody can guess the voter’s choice from the position of
the cast vote-code in this list.
VC initialization data: The EA uses an (Nv   fv, Nv)-
VSS (Verifiable Secret-Sharing) scheme to split msk
and every receipt`,j , denoted as (kmskk1, . . . , kmskkNv )
and (kreceipt`,jk1, . . . , kreceipt`,jkNv ). For each
vote-code`,j in each ballot, the EA also computes
H`,j  SHA256(vote-code`,j , salt`,j), where salt`,j is
a 64-bit random number. H`,j allows each VC node
to validate a vote-code`,j individually (without network
communication), while still keeping the vote-code`,j secret.
To preserve voter privacy, these tuples are also shuffled using
⇡X` . The initialization data for V Ci is structured as below:
kmskki
serial-no`
Part A
(H
`,⇡A
`
(1)
, salt
`,⇡A
`
(1)
) kreceipt
`,⇡A
`
(1)
ki
. . . . . .
(H
`,⇡A
`
(m)
, salt
`,⇡A
`
(m)
) kreceipt
`,⇡A
`
(m)
ki
Part B
(H
`,⇡B
`
(1)
, salt
`,⇡B
`
(1)
) kreceipt
`,⇡B
`
(1)
ki
. . . . . .
(H
`,⇡B
`
(m)
, salt
`,⇡B
`
(m)
) kreceipt
`,⇡B
`
(m)
ki
Trustee initialization data: The EA uses (ht, Nt)-VSS to
split the opening of encoded option commitments Com(~ei),
denoted as (
⇥
~ei
⇤
1
, . . . ,
⇥
~ei
⇤
Nt
). The initialization data for
Trusteei is structured as below:
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serial-no`
Part A
Com(~e
⇡A
`
(i)
)

~e
⇡A
`
(i)
 
`· · · · · ·
Part B
Com(~e
⇡B
`
(i)
)

~e
⇡B
`
(i)
 
`· · · · · ·
Similarly, the state of zero knowledge proofs for ballot
correctness is shared among the trustees using (ht, Nt)-VSS.
For further details, we refer the interested reader to [14].
E. Vote Collectors
VC is a distributed system of Nv nodes, running our
voting and vote-set consensus protocols. VC nodes have
private and authenticated channels to each other, and a public
(unsecured) channel for voters. The voting protocol starts
when a voter submits a VOTEhserial-no, vote-codei message
to a VC node. We call this node the responder, as it is
responsible for delivering the receipt to the voter. The VC
node confirms the current system time is within the defined
election hours, and locates the ballot with the specified
serial-no. It also verifies this ballot has not been used for
this election, with either the same or a different vote code.
Then, it compares the vote-code against every hashed vote
code in each ballot line, until it locates the correct entry.
At this point, it multicasts an ENDORSEhserial-no, vote-codei
message to all VC nodes. Each VC node, after making
sure it has not endorsed another vote code for this ballot,
responds with an ENDORSEMENThserial-no, vote-code,sigVCii
message, where sigVCi is a digital signature of the spe-
cific serial-no and vote-code, with V Ci’s private key. The
responder collects Nv   fv valid signatures and forms a
uniqueness certificate UCERT for this ballot. Subsequently,
it obtains the receipt-share corresponding to the specific
vote-code from its local database, and marks the ballot as
pending for the specific vote-code. Finally, it multicasts
a VOTE_Phserial-no, vote-code, receipt-share, UCERTi mes-
sage to all VC nodes, disclosing its share of the receipt. In
case the located ballot is marked as voted for the specific
vote-code, the VC node sends the stored receipt to the voter
without any further interaction with other VC nodes.
Each VC node that receives a VOTE_P message, first verifies
the validity of UCERT, and validates the received receipt-share
according to the verifiable secret sharing scheme used. Then, it
performs the same validations as the responder, and multicasts
another VOTE_P message (only once), disclosing its share of
the receipt. When a node collects hv = Nv   fv valid shares,
it uses the verifiable secret sharing reconstruction algorithm
to reconstruct the receipt (the secret) and marks the ballot as
voted for the specific vote-code. Additionally, the responder
node sends this receipt back to the voter. The formation of a
valid UCERT gives our algorithms the following guarantees:
a) No matter how many responders and vote codes are active
at the same time for the same ballot, if a UCERT is formed
for vote code vca, no other uniqueness certificate for any
vote code different than vca can be formed.
b) By verifying the UCERT before disclosing a VC node’s
receipt share, we guarantee the voter’s receipt cannot be
reconstructed unless a valid UCERT is present.
At election end time, each VC node stops processing
ENDORSE, ENDORSEMENT, VOTE and VOTE_P messages,
and initiates the vote-set consensus protocol, by performing
the following steps for each registered ballot:
1) Send ANNOUNCEhserial-no, vote-code,UCERTi to all
nodes. The vote-code will be null if the node knows
of no vote code for this ballot.
2) Wait for Nv   fv such messages. If any of these
messages contains a valid vote code vca, accompanied
by a valid UCERT, change the local state immediately,
by setting vca as the vote code used for this ballot.
3) Participate in a Binary Consensus protocol, with the
subject “Is there a valid vote code for this ballot?”.
Enter with an opinion of 1, if a valid vote code is
locally known, or a 0 otherwise.
4) If the result of Binary Consensus is 0, consider the
ballot not voted.
5) Else, if the result of Binary Consensus is 1, consider
the ballot voted. There are two sub-cases here:
a) If vote code vca, accompanied by a valid UCERT
is locally known, consider the ballot voted for vca.
b) If, however, vca is not known, send a
RECOVER-REQUESThserial-noi message to all
VC nodes, wait for the first valid RECOVER-
RESPONSEhserial-no, vca,UCERTi response, and
update the local state accordingly.
Steps 1-2 ensure used vote codes are dispersed across nodes.
Recall our receipt generation requires Nv   fv shares to be
revealed by distinct VC nodes, of which at least Nv   2fv
are honest. Note that any two Nv   fv subsets of Nv have at
least one honest node in common. Because of this, if a receipt
was generated, at least one honest node’s ANNOUNCE will be
processed by every honest node, and all honest VC nodes will
obtain the corresponding vote code in these two steps. Thus,
all honest nodes enter step 3 with an opinion of 1, and binary
consensus is guaranteed to deliver 1 as the resulting value, thus
safeguarding our contract against the voters. In any case, step
3 guarantees all VC nodes arrive at the same conclusion, on
whether this ballot is voted or not.
In the algorithm outlined above, the result from binary
consensus is translated from 0/1 to a status of “not-voted”
or a unique valid vote code, in steps 4-5. The 5b case of
this translation, in particular, requires additional justification.
Assume, for example, that a voter submitted a valid vote code
vca, but a receipt was not generated before election end time.
In this case, an honest vote collector node V Ci may not be
aware of vca at step 3, as steps 1-2 do not make any guarantees
in this case. Thus, V Ci may rightfully enter consensus with a
value of 0. However, when honest nodes’ opinions are mixed,
the consensus algorithm may produce any result. In case the
result is 1, V Ci will not possess the correct vote code vca, and
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thus will not be able to properly translate the result to a vote
code. This is what our recovery sub-protocol is designed for.
V Ci will issue a RECOVER-REQUEST multicast, and we claim
that another honest node, V Ch exists that possesses vca and
replies with it. The reason for the existence of an honest V Ch
is straightforward and stems from the properties of the binary
consensus problem definition. If all honest nodes enter binary
consensus with the same opinion a, the result of any consensus
algorithm is guaranteed to be a. Since we have an honest node
V Ci, that entered consensus with a value of 0, but a result
of 1 was produced, there has to exist another honest node
V Ch that entered consensus with an opinion of 1. Since V Ch
is honest, it must possess vca, along with the corresponding
UCERT, as no other vote code vcb can be active at the same
time for this ballot. Again, because V Ch is honest, it will
follow the protocol and reply with a well formed RECOVER-
REPLY. Additionally, the existence of UCERT guarantees that
any malicious replies can be safely identified and discarded.
At the end of this algorithm, each node submits the resulting
set of voted hserial-no, vote-codei tuples to each BB node,
which concludes its operation for the specific election.
F. Voter
We expect the voter, who has received a ballot from EA ,
to know the URLs of at least fv + 1 VC nodes. To vote, she
picks one part of the ballot at random, selects the vote code
representing her chosen option, and loops, selecting a VC node
at random and posting the vote code, until she receives a valid
receipt. After the election, the voter can verify two things from
the updated BB . First, she can verify her cast vote code is
included in the tally set. Second, she can verify that the unused
part of her ballot, as “opened” at the BB , matches the copy
she received before the election started. This step verifies that
the vote codes are associated with the expected options as
printed in the ballot. Finally, the voter can delegate both of
these checks to an auditor, without sacrificing her privacy. This
is because the cast vote code does not reveal her choice, and
because the unused part of the ballot is completely unrelated
to the used one.
G. Bulletin Board
A BB node functions as public repository of election-specific
information. By definition, it can be read via a public and
anonymous channel. Writes, on the other hand, happen over
an authenticated channel, implemented with PKI originating
from the voting system. BB nodes are independent from each
other, as a BB node never directly contacts another BB node.
Readers are expected to issue a read request to all BB nodes,
and trust the reply that comes from the majority. Writers are
also expected to write to all BB nodes; their submissions are
always verified, and explained in more detail below.
After the setup phase, each BB node publishes its initial-
ization data. During election hours, BB nodes remain inert.
After the voting phase, each BB node receives from each VC
node, the final vote-code set and the shares of msk. Once it
receives fv + 1 identical final vote code sets, it accepts and
publishes the final vote code set. Once it receives Nv   fv
valid key shares (again from VC nodes), it reconstructs the
msk, decrypts all the encrypted vote codes in its initialization
data, and publishes them.
At this point, the cryptographic payloads corresponding to
the cast vote codes are made available to the trustees. Trustees,
in turn, read from the BB subsystem, perform their individual
calculations and then write to the BBs; these writes are verified
by the trustees’ keys, generated by the EA . Once enough
trustees have posted valid data, the BB node combines them
and publishes the final election result.
We intentionally designed our BB nodes to be as simple
as possible for the reader, refraining from using a Replicated
State Machine, which would require readers to run algorithm-
specific software. The robustness of BB nodes comes from
controlling all write accesses to them. Writes from VC nodes
are verified against their honest majority threshold. Further
writes are allowed only from trustees, verified by their keys.
Finally, a reader of our BB nodes should post her read
request to all nodes, and accept what the majority responds
with (fb + 1 is enough). We acknowledge there might be
temporary state divergence (among BB nodes), from the time
a writer updates the first BB node, until the same writer updates
the last BB node. However, given our thresholds, this should
be only momentary, alleviated with simple retries. Thus, if
there is no reply backed by a clear majority, the reader should
retry until there is one.
H. Trustees
After the end of election hours, each trustee fetches all the
election data from the BB subsystem and verifies its validity.
For each ballot, there are two possible valid outcomes: i) one of
the A/B parts are voted, ii) none of the A/B parts are voted. If
both A/B parts of a ballot are marked as voted, then the ballot
is considered as invalid and is discarded. Similarly, trustees
also discard those ballots where more than one commitments
in a single part (A or B) are marked as voted. In case (i),
for each encoded option commitment in the unused part,
Trustee` submits its corresponding share of the opening of the
commitment to the BB . For each encoded option commitment
in the voted part, Trustee` computes and posts the share of
the final message of the corresponding zero knowledge proof,
showing the validity of those commitments. Meanwhile, those
commitments marked as voted are collected to a tally set
Etally. In case (ii), for each encoded option commitment in
both parts, Trustee` submits its corresponding share of the
opening of the commitment to the BB . Finally, denote D(`)tally
as Trustee`’s set of shares of option encoding commitment
openings, corresponding to the commitments in Etally. Trustee`
computes the opening share for Esum as T` =
P
D2D(`)tally
and
then submits T` to each BB node.
I. Auditors
Auditors are participants of our system who can indepen-
dently verify the election process. The role of the auditor can
be assumed by voters or any other party. After election end
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time, auditors read information from the BB and verify the
correct execution of the election, by verifying the following:
a) within each opened ballot, no two vote codes are the same,
b) there are no two submitted vote codes associated with any
single ballot part, c) within each ballot, no more than one part
has been used, d) all the openings of the commitments are
valid, e) all the zero-knowledge proofs that are associated with
the used ballot parts are completed and valid. In case they
received audit information (an unused ballot part and a cast
vote code) from voters who wish to delegate verification, they
can also verify: i) the submitted vote codes are consistent
with the ones received from the voters, ii) the openings of the
unused ballot parts are consistent with the ones received from
the voters.
IV. SECURITY OF D-DEMOS
In this section, we show that our e-voting system achieves
liveness and safety, as well as end-to-end verifiability and voter
privacy at the same level of [29]1. Due to space constraints,
we provide high-level overviews of our proof strategies, and
refer the reader to the extended version [16] for the full proofs.
We use m,n to denote the number of options and voters
respectively. We denote by   the cryptographic security
parameter and we write negl( ) to denote that a function is
negligible in  . We assume the following security guarantees
for the underlying cryptographic tools:
1) The probability that an adversary running in   steps forges
digital signatures is negl( ).
2) There exists a constant c < 1 s.t. the probability an
adversary running in O(2 
c
) steps breaks the hiding property
of the option-encoding commitments is negl( ).
Liveness. We prove the liveness that our system can guarantee
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Liveness). Let   be an upper bound on the
communication delay and   be an upper bound on the
synchronization loss in all node’s clocks with respect to a
global clock. Let Tcomp be the worst-case running time of any
procedure run by the VC nodes and the voters during the
voting protocol. Then, every honest voter that is engaged in the
voting protocol at least (fv+1) ·
 
(2Nv+5)Tcomp+12 +6 
 
clock steps before election end, will obtain a valid receipt.
Proof strategy overview. If an honest voter submits her vote
to an honest responder, then by the description of the VC nodes
in Section III-E and the bounds  , , Tcomp, we can show that
the upper bound on the time required for the honest voter to
obtain and verify the validity of her receipt is Twait := (2Nv +
5)Tcomp + 12 + 6 . Thus, after Twait steps, she will blacklist
this VC node and submit the same vote to another randomly
selected VC node. By the VC fault tolerance threshold, she
will run into a honest responder after at most fv + 1 attempts.
Safety. Our safety theorem is stated in the form of a contract
adhered by the VC subsystem.
1In [29], the authors use the term voter privacy/receipt-freeness, but they
actually refer to the same property.
Theorem 2 (Safety). Any honest voter who receives a valid
receipt from a VC node, is assured her vote will be published
on the honest BB nodes and included in the election tally, with
probability at least 1  negl( )  fv264 fv .
Proof strategy overview. Assume an adversary that attempts
to produce a valid receipt without interacting with the honest
VC nodes by either (i) forging digital signatures, hence
producing fake UCERT certificates during vote collection, or
(ii) guessing the randomly generated valid 64-bit receipt for
some honest voter. By the security of digital signatures, (i)
happens only with negl( ) probability. Further, since there are
at most fv malicious VC nodes, the adversary has at most fv
attempts (there are 264 i choices left after i attempts) to guess
the receipt for each voter, thus (ii) happens with probability
no more than
fv 1X
i=0
1
264   i 
fv
264   fv .
Now, let V be an honest voter that has obtained a receipt
reconstructed from a complete VC interaction. Then, by the
security arguments stated in Section III-E (steps 1-5), every
honest VC node will submit V ’s vote to each BB node by
including it in the set of voted tuples. By the fault tolerance
thresholds, the honest BB nodes will publish V ’s vote, while
the ht out-of Nt honest trustees will read V ’s vote from the
majority of BB nodes and include it in the election tally.
End-to-end verifiability. We define end-to-end verifiability by
modifying the framework introduced in [29] accordingly to
our setting. We require fault tolerance only for the BB nodes
and prove the end-to-end verifiability of D-DEMOS in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3 (End-to-end verifiability). Let ✓ be the number of
honest voters. Let A be an adversary that controls the EA, all
the VC nodes, all the trustee nodes and can statically corrupt
up to fb BB nodes. Then, if the honest voters and at least
one auditor perform verification, the probability that A causes
tally deviation d from the intended election result without being
detected, is no more than 2 ✓ + 2 d.
Proof strategy overview. The proof follows the lines of [29,
Theorem 4]. Specifically, by the number of honest voters,
the entropy of the collected voters’ coins is at least ✓. As
in [29, Section 3.4], we can show that the verification of
the Chaum-Pedersen zero-knowledge proofs guarantees the
correctness of all the committed ballots in the BB , except
some probability error 2 ✓. In case of all valid zero-knowledge
proofs, A may attack by pointing the honest voter to audit in
a BB location where the audit data is inconsistent with the
respective information in at least one part of the voter’s ballot.
As in [29, Theorem 4], we can show that every such single
attack has 1/2 success probability (the voter had chosen to vote
with the inconsistent ballot part) and in case of success, adds
1 to the tally deviation. Thus, in this case, the probability that
A causes tally deviation d is no more than 2 d.
Voter Privacy. Our definition of voter privacy is similar
to [29]. That is, an adversary instructs the honest voters to
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vote according to either one of two alternative ways under
the restriction that election tally is the same for both ways.
The systems achieves voter privacy if the adversary cannot
distinguish which alternative was followed by the honest voters.
We require that the EA is destroyed after setup.
Theorem 4 (Voter Privacy). Let c, c0 be constants s.t. c0 2 (0, c)
and n2(n+ 1)m · 2  = O(2 c0 ). Let A be an adversary that
controls all the VC nodes, up to fb BB nodes, up to ft trustees,
and up to   voters, observes the network during election and
obtains all the voters’ audit information. Then, A cannot break
voter privacy if the underlying commitment scheme is hiding
against all 2 
c
adversaries.
Proof strategy overview. The proof follows the lines of [29,
Theorem 5]. Due to full VC corruption, A learns all the vote-
codes. Even so, the audit information of every voter leaks
nothing about her vote, as each ballot part is independently and
randomly generated, and the voter could “lie” about her used
ballot part (i.e. switch the vote-code and option correspondence
in the used ballot part, so that the submitted vote-code appears
associated with the option in the alternative the voter did not
follow). Moreover, we can show that if A distinguishes the
alternative followed by honest voters, then we can construct an
algorithm B that invokes A and simulates an election execution
where it guesses (i) the corrupted voters’ coins (in 2  expected
attempts) and (ii) the election tally (in (n+ 1)m expected
attempts). Thus, B finishes a compete simulation with high
probability running in n2(n+ 1)m · 2  = O(2 c0 ) steps. By
exploiting the distinguishing advantage of A, B can break the
hiding property of the option-encoding commitment scheme
in O(2 
c0
) = o(2 
c
) steps, thus leading to contradiction.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Implementation: We implement the Election Authority com-
ponent of our system as a standalone C++ application, and all
other components in Java. Whenever we store data structures
on disk, or transmit them over the network, we use Google
Protocol Buffers [2] to encode and decode them efficiently. We
use the MIRACL library [4] for elliptic-curve cryptographic
operations. In all applications requiring a database, we use
PostgreSQL [6].
We build an asynchronous communications stack (ACS) on
top of Java, using Netty [5] and the asynchronous PostgreSQL
driver from [1], using TLS based authenticated channels for
inter-node communication, and a public HTTP channel for
public access. This infrastructure uses connection-oriented
sockets, but allows the applications running on the upper
layers to operate in a message-oriented fashion. We use this
infrastructure to implement VC and BB nodes. We implement
Bracha’s Binary Consensus directly on top of the ACS, and
we use that to implement our Vote Set Consensus algorithm
of Section III-E. We introduce a version of Binary Consensus
that operates in batches of arbitrary size; this way, we achieve
greater network efficiency. We implement “verifiable secret
sharing with honest dealer”, by utilizing Shamir’s Secret Share
library implementation [7], and having the EA sign each share.
We implement a Mozilla Firefox extension which automates
the task of reading from the BB , by intercepting the initial read
request, replicating it to all BB nodes, capturing all replies,
and showing a single correct reply only when it comes from
the majority. For more details, see [16].
Evaluation: We experimentally evaluate the performance of
our voting system, focusing mostly on our vote collection
algorithm, which is the most performance critical part. We
conduct our experiments using a cluster of 12 machines,
connected over a Gigabit Ethernet switch. The first 4 are
equipped with Hexa-core Intel Xeon E5-2420 @ 1.90GHz,
16GB RAM, and one 1TB SATA disk, running CentOS 7
Linux, and we use them to run our VC nodes. The remaining
8 comprise dual Intel(R) Xeon(TM) CPUs @ 2.80GHz, with
4GB of main memory, and two 50GB disks, running CentOS
6 Linux, and we use them as clients.
We implement a multi-threaded voting client to simulate
concurrency. This client starts the requested number of threads,
each of which loads its corresponding ballots from disk and
waits for a signal to start. From then on, the thread enters a
loop where it picks one VC node and vote code at random,
requests the voting page from the selected VC (HTTP GET),
submits its vote (HTTP POST), and waits for the reply (receipt).
This simulates multiple concurrent voters casting their votes
in parallel, and gives an understanding of the behavior of the
system under the corresponding load.
We employ the PostgreSQL RDBMS [6] to store all VC
initialization data from the EA . We start off by demonstrating
our system’s capability of handling large-scale elections. To this
end, we generate election data for referendums, i.e., m = 2,
and vary the total number of ballots n from 50 million to
250 million (note the 2012 US voting population size was
235 million). We fix the number of concurrent clients to 400
and cast a total of 200,000 ballots, which are enough for our
system to reach its steady-state operation. Figure 1a shows the
throughput of the system declines slowly, even with a five-fold
increase in the number of eligible voters.
In our second experiment, we explore the effect of m, i.e.,
the number of election options, on system performance. We
vary the number of options from m = 2 to m = 10. Each
election has a total of n = 200, 000 ballots which we spread
evenly across 400 concurrent clients. As illustrated in Figure 1b,
our vote collection protocol manages to deliver approximately
the same throughput regardless of the value of m. Notice that
the only extra overhead m induces during vote collection, is
the increase in the number of hash verifications during vote
code validation, as there are more vote codes per ballot.
Next, we evaluate the scalability of our vote collection pro-
tocol by varying the number of vote collectors and concurrent
clients. We eliminate the database, by caching the election data
in memory and servicing voters from the cache, to measure
the net communication and processing costs of our voting
protocol. We vary the number of VC nodes from 4 to 16,
and distribute them across the 4 physical machines. Note that,
co-located nodes are unable to produce vote receipts via local
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Figure 1. Throughput graphs of the vote collection phase versus the number of total election ballots n (1a) and the number of total election options m (1b). A
total of 200,000 ballots were cast by 400 concurrent clients on 4 VC nodes. Figure 1c illustrates the duration of all system phases. Results depicted are for 4
VCs, n = 200,000 and m = 4. All these plots are for disk based experiments.
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Figure 2. Latency (2a, 2d) and throughput graphs (2b, 2e) of the vote collection algorithm vs. the number of VC nodes. Figures (2c and 2f) illustrate
throughput versus the number of concurrent clients. First row illustrates LAN setting plots. Second row illustrates WAN setting plots. Election parameters are
n = 200,000 and m = 4.
messages only, since the Nv  fv threshold cannot be satisfied,
i.e., cross-machine communication is still the dominant factor
in receipt generation. For election data, we use the dataset with
n = 200, 000 ballots and m = 4 options.
In Figures 2a and 2b, we plot the average response time
and throughput of our vote collection protocol, versus the
number of vote collectors, under various concurrent client
scenarios. Results illustrate an almost linear increase in the
client-perceived latency, for all concurrency scenarios, up to
13 VC nodes. From this point on, when four logical VC nodes
are placed on a single physical machine, we notice a non-linear
increase in latency. We attribute this to the overloading of the
memory bus, a resource shared among all processors of the
system, which services all (in-memory) database operations.
In terms of overall system throughput, however, the penalty
of tolerating extra failures, i.e., increasing the number of vote
collectors, manifests early on. We notice an almost 50% decline
in system throughput from 4 to 7 VC nodes. However, further
increases in the number of vote collectors lead to a much
smoother, linear decrease. We repeat the same experiment by
emulating a WAN environment using netem [28], a network
emulator for Linux. We inject a uniform latency of 25ms
(typical for US coast-to-coast communication [3]) for each
network packet exchanged between vote collector nodes, and
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present our results in Figures 2d and 2e. A simple comparison
between LAN and WAN plots illustrates our system manages to
deliver the same level of throughput and average response time,
regardless of the increased intra-VC communication latency.
Finally, in Figures 2c and 2f, we plot system throughput versus
the number of concurrent clients, in LAN and WAN settings
respectively. Results show our system has the nice property
of delivering nearly constant throughput, regardless of the
incoming request load, for a given number of VC nodes.
Finally, in Figure 1c, we illustrate a breakdown of the
duration of each phase of the complete voting system (D-
DEMOS), versus the total number of ballots cast. We assume
immediate phase succession, i.e., the vote collection phase
ends when all votes have been cast, at which point the vote
set consensus phase starts, and so on. The “Push to BB and
encrypted tally” phase is the time it takes for the vote collectors
to push the final vote code set to the BB nodes, including
all actions necessary by the BB to calculate and publish the
encrypted result. The “Publish result” phase is the time it takes
for Trustees to calculate and push their share of the opening of
the final tally to the BB , and for the BB to publish the final
tally. Note that, in most voting procedures, the vote collection
phase would in reality last several hours and even days as
stipulated by national law (see Estonia voting system). Thus,
looking only at the post-election phases of the system, we see
the time it takes to publish the tally on the BB is quite fast.
Overall, although we introduced Byzantine Fault Tolerance
across all phases of a voting system (besides setup), we
demonstrate it achieves high performance, enough to run real-
life elections of large electorate bodies.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented the world’s first complete, state-of-the-art,
end-to-end verifiable, distributed voting system with no single
point of failure besides setup. The system allows voters to
verify their vote was tallied-as-intended without the assistance
of special software or trusted devices, and external auditors to
verify the correctness of the election process. Additionally, the
system allows voters to delegate auditing to a third party auditor,
without sacrificing their privacy. We provided a model and
security analysis of our voting system. Finally, we implemented
a prototype of the integrated system, measured its performance
and demonstrated its ability to handle large scale elections.
Acknowledgements: This work was partially supported by
ERC Starting Grant # 279237 and by the FINER project funded
by the Greek Secretariat of Research and Technology under
action ”ARISTEIA 1”.
REFERENCES
[1] “Asynchronous postgresql java driver.” https://github.com/alaisi/
postgres-async-driver/.
[2] “Google protocol buffers,” https://code.google.com/p/protobuf/.
[3] “High performance browser networking: What every web
developer should know about networking and web performance,”
http://chimera.labs.oreilly.com/books/1230000000545/ch01.html#
PROPAGATION LATENCY.
[4] “Miracl multi-precision integer and rational arithmetic c/c++ library.”
http://www.certivox.com/miracl/.
[5] “Netty, an asynchronous network application framework.” http://netty.io/.
[6] “Postgresql rdbms.” http://www.postgresql.org/.
[7] “Shamir’s secret share in java.” https://github.com/timtiemens/secretshare.
[8] B. Adida, “Helios: Web-based open-audit voting,” in USENIX Security
Symposium, 2008.
[9] P.-L. Aublin, S. Ben Mokhtar, and V. Que´ma, “Rbft: Redundant byzantine
fault tolerance,” in IEEE ICDCS, 2013.
[10] J. Benaloh, M. D. Byrne, B. Eakin, P. T. Kortum, N. McBurnett,
O. Pereira, P. B. Stark, D. S. Wallach, G. Fisher, J. Montoya, M. Parker,
and M. Winn, “STAR-vote: A secure, transparent, auditable, and reliable
voting system,” in EVT/WOTE ’13, Aug. 2013.
[11] M. Castro and B. Liskov, “Practical byzantine fault tolerance,” in OSDI,
February 1999.
[12] D. Chaum, “Surevote: Technical overview,” in Proceedings of the
Workshop on Trustworthy Elections, ser. WOTE, Aug. 2001.
[13] D. Chaum, A. Essex, R. Carback, J. Clark, S. Popoveniuc, A. Sherman,
and P. Vora, “Scantegrity: End-to-end voter-verifiable optical-scan voting,”
Security & Privacy, IEEE, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 40–46, 2008.
[14] D. Chaum and T. P. Pedersen, “Wallet databases with observers,” in
CRYPTO ’92. Springer-Verlag, 1993, pp. 89–105.
[15] D. Chaum, P. Y. A. Ryan, and S. A. Schneider, “A practical voter-
verifiable election scheme,” in ESORICS 2005, Sept. 2005, pp. 118–139.
[16] N. Chondros, B. Zhang, T. Zacharias, P. Diamantopoulos, S. Maneas,
C. Patsonakis, A. Delis, A. Kiayias, and M. Roussopoulos, “A
distributed, end-to-end verifiable, internet voting system, extended
version,” CoRR, vol. abs/1507.06812, 2015. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.06812
[17] M. R. Clarkson, S. Chong, and A. C. Myers, “Civitas: Toward a secure
voting system,” in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2008.
[18] A. Clement, M. Kapritsos, S. Lee, Y. Wang, L. Alvisi, M. Dahlin, and
T. Riche, “Upright cluster services,” in Proc. of ACM SOSP, 2009.
[19] A. Clement, E. L. Wong, L. Alvisi, M. Dahlin, and M. Marchetti, “Making
byzantine fault tolerant systems tolerate byzantine faults.” in NSDI, vol. 9,
2009, pp. 153–168.
[20] J. Cowling, D. Myers, B. Liskov, R. Rodrigues, and L. Shrira, “Hq
replication: A hybrid quorum protocol for byzantine fault tolerance,” in
Proceedings of USENIX OSDI, 2006.
[21] R. Cramer, R. Gennaro, and B. Schoenmakers, “A secure and optimally
efficient multi-authority election scheme,” in EUROCRYPT, 1997.
[22] C. Culnane, P. Y. A. Ryan, S. Schneider, and V. Teague, “vvote: a
verifiable voting system (DRAFT),” CoRR, vol. abs/1404.6822, 2014.
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.6822
[23] C. Culnane and S. Schneider, “A peered bulletin board for robust use in
verifiable voting systems,” in Computer Security Foundations Symposium
(CSF), 2014 IEEE 27th. IEEE, 2014, pp. 169–183.
[24] G. Dini, “A secure and available electronic voting service for a large-
scale distributed system,” Future Generation Computer Systems, vol. 19,
no. 1, pp. 69–85, 2003.
[25] T. El Gamal, “A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based
on discrete logarithms,” in Springer-Verlag CRYPTO 1984.
[26] K. Fisher, R. Carback, and A. Sherman, “Punchscan: introduction and
system definition of a high-integrity election system,” in WOTE, 2006.
[27] K. Gjøsteen, “The norwegian internet voting protocol,” IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive, vol. 2013, p. 473, 2013. [Online]. Available:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/473
[28] S. Hemminger et al., “Network emulation with netem,” in Linux conf
au. Citeseer, 2005, pp. 18–23.
[29] A. Kiayias, T. Zacharias, and B. Zhang, “End-to-end verifiable elections
in the standard model,” in EUROCRYPT 2015, April 2015, pp. 468–498.
[30] R. Kotla, L. Alvisi, M. Dahlin, A. Clement, and E. Wong, “Zyzzyva:
Speculative byzantine fault tolerance,” in SOSP, Oct 2007.
[31] M. Kutylowski and F. Zago´rski, “Scratch, click & vote: E2E
voting over the internet,” in Towards Trustworthy Elections, New
Directions in Electronic Voting, 2010, pp. 343–356. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3 21
[32] N. Lynch, Distributed Algorithms. Morgan Kaufmann, 1996.
[33] T. Pedersen, “Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable
secret sharing,” in Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO, 1991.
[34] B. Schneier, Applied cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1996.
[35] F. Zago´rski, R. T. Carback, D. Chaum, J. Clark, A. Essex, and P. L.
Vora, “Remotegrity: Design and use of an end-to-end verifiable remote
voting system,” in Applied Cryptography and Network Security, 2013.
10
